Since 1980 the federal government has implemented a variety of programs to promote the adoption of children from foster care. A key part of these programs has been the use of subsidies to lower the cost of adopting and parenting children from foster care. Although subsidies are a key part of federal policy there has been relatively little empirical research on the effect of subsidies on adoption rates. This paper uses data from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis System to estimate the impact of subsidy rates on adoption rates. Subsidies to families that adopt children from foster care have a positive and statistically significant effect on adoption rates. A one percent increase in average subsidies increases adoption rates by as much as 0.20 percent.
INTRODUCTION
According to a recent national survey one in three adults in the United States has considered adoption as a way to start a family (Byron and Deoudes 2002, National Adoption Day Coalition 2005 ). Yet at the end of fiscal year 2003, 118,000 children in foster care were waiting to be adopted. In each year since the mid-1970s between 20 and 25 percent of children in foster care have needed an adoptive family, but the number of families who adopt children from foster care has never met more than about 40 percent of the need. Evidence indicates that adoption is associated with better educational and psychological outcomes outcomes for children than long term foster care (Triseliotis 2002) . In addition, governments spend about half as much to support a child who has been adopted from foster care as they do to support a similar child who remains in long term foster care (Barth et al. 2005 ).
Since 1997, the federal government has redoubled efforts intended to increase the adoption of children from foster care, most notably the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. The overall strategy for increasing adoptions from foster care has been threefold. The first part of the strategy has been to increase the demand by marketing adoption of children from foster care. The second part of the strategy has been to increase the quantity of adoption services demanded by lowering the cost of adoption from foster care. The third part of the strategy has been to create financial incentives for states to provide adoption services to match waiting children with prospective adoptive families.
The overall strategy is logical, but the formation and implementation of specific policies has suffered from a lack of research regarding the relative impact of the different programs on the quantity of adoptions. The significance of this problem has been highlighted recently by budget crises in several states. When policymakers in Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma, recently tried to reduce support for children adopted from foster care to help balance their state budgets (Eckholm 2005) , they did so without a reliable estimate of the probable impact of the policy change on adoption rates. This paper begins to fill the gap in our knowledge about the effectiveness of adoption policy by estimating the relationship between adoption subsidies and adoptions from foster care.
Section one describes the development of federal policy on adoption from foster care since 1980. Section two provides an economic analysis of adoption policy, explaining the expected influence of different types of policy on the quantity of adoptions from foster care. This economic analysis of adoption policy provides the framework for the empirical estimation of adoptions from foster care from 1996 through 2002 presented in section three.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE ADOPTION
Children wait in U.S. foster care because their birth families are unable to provide adequate and safe care. Since 1978 Congress has tried to promote the adoption of waiting children from foster care. However, even in years when the number of adoptions rose, the number of waiting children rose faster.
1 As the number of waiting children in foster care climbed, Congress responded to the recurring foster care crises with new adoption incentive programs.
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The first federal adoption incentive was contained in the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-266) . The law created a discretionary grants program to fund state promotion of the adoption of children with so-called special needs. Though the grants program was small relative to later incentives, the introduction of the term special needs has had a significant impact on adoption policy. Special needs are characteristics of a child that can make adoption more difficult. Special needs can include physical, mental, learning and emotional disabilities (or risk of these conditions), older age, minority status, or membership in a sibling group that ought to be adopted together. Most children who are adopted from foster care have one or more special needs (USGAO 2002, p. 20 Analyses of early use of adoption assistance subsidies indicated that use of the subsidy was associated with shorter stays in foster care for children (Sedlak and Broadhurst 1993 , Avery and Mont 1992 , but no data were available to ascertain whether the subsidies influenced the number of adoptions from foster care that were actually finalized in the states. A recent Department of Health and Human Services report finds a positive relationship between subsidies and adoptions, but does not consider other policy or economic factors that might influence adoptions (Dalberth et al 2005) .
Nonetheless, adoption assistance subsidy payments remain the primary vehicle for on-going federal and state support of adoptions of children from foster care. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34) created an itemized deduction of up to $1,500 for qualified expenses relating to the adoption of children with special needs. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) provided matching funds of up to $1,000 to states that pay the up-front expenses of the adoption of a child from foster care. The adoption tax deduction was replaced by the Adoption Tax
Credit in 1996 (P.L. 104-188). The Adoption Tax Credit was available beginning in 1997 to any family finalizing an adoption from any source, including an adoption from foster care. The credit could be taken against up to $5,000 in qualified expenses for adoption ($6,000 for the adoption of a child with special needs). An income exclusion of up to $5,000 was also made available for adoptive parents whose employers offered reimbursement for adoption expenses. In its study of utilization of the adoption tax credit, the Department of the Treasury found that only 15 percent of families who claimed the credit had adopted a child with special needs, and the tax benefits to these families was only eight percent of total benefits claimed (US Dept. of Treasury 2000, p.
2). Expenses for adoption from foster care are small, usually zero, because states use the 1986 provision of federal matching funds to pay the up-front cost of adoption for these families. The result is that most families who adopt children from foster care received no benefits from the Adoption Tax Credit. (1993) . These estimates are quite incomplete. Moreover, Penelope Maza (1999) concludes that the prior sources of data on adoptions from foster care contain significant undercounts. 7 In part because so few families who adopted children from foster care were able to utilize earlier adoption tax benefits, it is not known how families considering adoption will respond to the incentive of the unqualified tax credit. 8 This paper provides indirect evidence on the possible responsiveness of the one-time financial incentive by estimating how responsive families have been to the on-going financial incentive of adoption assistance subsidy payments relative to their responsive to existing programs that cover the up-front costs of adoption.
THE MARKET FOR ADOPTION SERVICES
Economic research on adoption mainly concerns the relinquishment of infants and their subsequent adoption. Economists have primarily been interested in explaining why there are so few infants available for adoption through private agencies, lawyers, and facilitators, while there are so many prospective adoptive families who seek healthy infants. Marshall Medoff (1993) and Lisa Gennetian (1999) explore the determinants of relinquishment of infants by birth mothers and compare the determinants of relinquishment relative to abortion. Elizabeth Landes and Richard Posner (1978) develop an analysis of the market for infant adoption, with an eye towards recommending policy that would reduce the shortage of infants. Posner (1992) expands on the argument. Posner concludes that the birth parents, the adoptive parents, and the children would be better off if the price mechanism were allowed to function more freely. Posner posits that fewer prospective adopters would seek infants if their adoption was more expensive. He further argues that if birth mothers were fairly compensated more infants would be available; that is, Posner argues that the supply of infants available for adoption is upward sloping.
The focus of federal policy, as well as the focus of this paper, is on the demand for adoption services. The choice of the phrase adoption services is purposeful. Posner argues that the adoption market for infants is a market in which parental rights are exchanged. Critics such as Viviana Zelizer (1981) and Madelyn Freundlich (2000) denounce this stance as equivalent to baby-selling and argue that a model in which children go to the highest bidder is inconsistent with actual social work practice.
Children who are adopted through agencies (public, private, and international) are not simply allocated to those who are most willing to pay. Adoption agencies provide the professional service of matching an adoptive family with a child on the basis of the child's needs and the family's strengths. The approach of this paper combines these insights by sociologists and social workers with the basic economic premise that people respond to changes in relative prices. This paper therefore considers demand by prospective parents for adoption services, the service of being matched with a child that the parents are well-equipped to nurture.
For simplicity consider demand for only two types of adoption services:
adoption services from a domestic public agency that places children waiting in foster care and adoption services from an agency that places children in intercountry adoption. Assume that the adoption services from the two agencies are perfect substitutes in the eyes of the prospective parents, and that there is less than perfect substitution in the consumption of adoption services and all other goods. 9 Then household utility is
, where h is the subutility function for consumption of adoption services; qP is the number of children adopted through a domestic public agency; qI is the number of children adopted through an international agency; i α represents the expected characteristics of adoption services at the different agencies, including time to placement and expected characteristics of the children to be placed; and q2,…, qN are other goods consumed by the family.
The solution that maximizes family utility when there are only two sources of adoption services is, of course, straightforward. Families compare the marginal benefits of adoption from each source to the marginal cost from each source. Families choose to adopt through the domestic public agency if the marginal benefit of adoption services at a public agency relative to the benefit of international adoption is higher than the price of adoption services at the public agency relative to the international agency. The lower the price of adoption services at the public agency relative to the price of adoption services at the international agency, the more likely any individual family will be to choose to adopt through the domestic public agency, and the more common adoptions from foster care will be in aggregate. In other words, there is a standard downward sloping demand curve for adoption services.
Within this framework, there are two avenues open to government to promote adoption of waiting children from foster care. The first avenue is to shift out the demand curve by marketing adoption from foster care. The government follows this path with such efforts as the www.AdoptUSkids.org website; individual states and non-governmental adoption advocates follow this path with programs such as radio and television advertisements. Some ASFA bonus monies were used for "adoption awareness" (six states) and "recruitment of adoptive families" (11 states) (Cornerstone Consulting Group 2001). The second avenue open to government is to influence the relative prices of different adoption services. As outlined in the previous section, federal adoption policy aims to decrease the relative price of adoption services through a public agency through adoption assistance subsidies, through reimbursement of upfront expenses, and through adoption tax benefits.
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The idea that Congress can use tax and subsidy policy to influence choices in adoption is somewhat controversial. The degree of substitutability between providers of adoption services has not been measured. Some might argue that the market for adoption services is strictly segmented. 11 One possibility is that the market for adoption services is segmented by the age of the child to be adopted: families that seek infants or young children do not seek adoption through public agencies. It is true that most public agencies, and private agencies that contract with public agencies, match families mainly with older children and children with special needs. However, 6,478
(13 percent) of the 50,800 children adopted with state agency involvement in fiscal year 2001 were born in 1999, 2000, or 2001. 12 Conventional wisdom also posits that private and international adoption agencies, as well as adoption lawyers and adoption facilitators, promise to match families with healthy, light-skinned, young children or infants. But the emergence of a medical specialty to evaluate the medical condition of children adopted from abroad indicates that not all international adoptions involve healthy children. 13 Moreover, recent State Department statistics indicate that children of color from Africa and the Caribbean are adopted by families in the U.S. 14 The statements of prospective adoptive parents in focus groups in three major U.S. cities also indicate that families consider both international adoption and adoption from foster care (Wilson, Katz and Geen 2005, 27) . These facts lend support to the assumption that at least some families view adoption from foster care and international adoption as substitutes and may therefore be responsive to a policy-induced change in relative prices.
By all accounts, the price of international and private adoption services is quite high. The Department of Treasury reports that the average cost of adoptions claimed by families on their 1998 tax returns was $9,876; 52 percent of families reported expenses greater than $10,000 (USDOT 2000, p. 3). In contrast, almost all of the upfront costs of adoption from foster care are paid by states with help from the federal government, and the monthly adoption assistance subsidy is available (again from the states with federal help) for most children. Economic theory suggests that states that offer more generous support for adoptions from foster care will be more successful at meeting the federal goals for adoption promotion.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Consider the following model of the determinants of the rate of adoptions of children from foster care:
The dependent variable is the demographic measure of the adoption rate, adoptions from foster care per 1,000 births in the state. Regressions using the number of children adopted from foster care and adoptions from foster care per 100,000 people in the state give similar results. The vector S includes monthly adoption assistance subsidies, and also includes measures of the generosity of the reimbursements to offset the up-front costs of adoption. The vector X contains information about substitutes for adoption from foster care, and other variables that affect demand for waiting children such as income and age structure of the state population. Lastly, the number of adoptions of children in foster care across the states is likely to vary with the ability of the states to match waiting children with families. The ability of a state to match waiting children with families depends on child welfare policy and resources, especially available social worker time, characteristics of the population of the states, and characteristics of the waiting children in the states. These are the variables in the vector M. Descriptive statistics for variables included in X and M appear in table 2.
Earlier estimates of the effectiveness of adoption assistance payments as incentives are not based upon the actual subsidy paid, but upon the basic adoption assistance subsidy rates . Basic rates are, in a sense, advertised by the state departments of social services as being typical rates. Basic rates vary by age of the child, with higher rates supporting adoptions of older children.
Almost all states and local jurisdictions allow adoptive families to bargain over the actual rate of adoption assistance, so that basic and actual rates vary substantially (Hansen and Pollack 2005) . Because some adoptions from foster care are made without support of the adoption assistance subsidy, the average subsidy is less than the basic rate. 15 The real value of basic rates rose only $25 between 1996 and 2002, but the real value of actual subsidies paid nearly doubled. Once the more recent data are considered, basic rates do not have a statistically significant effect on adoptions.
The effect of the average real value of the adoption assistance subsidy on adoption rates is positive and statistically significant in three out of the four regression specifications presented in table 3. Of course, the coefficients are of small magnitude because adoption from foster care is a relatively rare event compared to births, but it of critical policy significance to document the positive effect of adoption assistance subsidies on adoptions.
As discussed above, in addition to the monthly adoption assistance subsidy, federal law encourages states to subsidize the up-front cost of adoption from foster care, including the cost of legal fees. The subsidy of up-front cost is offered in the form of matching funds to the states, up to $1,000 per adoption. That is, to utilize the full federal subsidy, the state must reimburse families at least $2,000. About two thirds of states utilize the full amount of federal matching funds. I include a dichotomous variable that equals one if the state reimburses at least $2,000 of up-front costs. These states have more adoptions from foster care, but the effect is not statistically significant, as shown in specification (2) As noted earlier, the data on adoptions outside AFCARS are scarce and subject to undercounts. Improving the quality adoption data is important to the study of the effectiveness of adoption policy. Consider intercountry adoption as a case in point. In 1996, the qualified Adoption Tax Credit lowered the price of private and intercountry adoption services at relative to the price of adoption services at domestic public agencies. From 1996 through 1999, the number of orphan visas issued by the U.S.
State Department increased 45 percent. 16 Some children waiting in foster care might have been adopted if the tax code had not altered relative prices.
Unfortunately, a measure of infertility treatment by state is not available.
Note, however, that the availability of medical technology to treat infertility may simultaneously reduce the demand for adoption and increase the measured fertility rate, which would tend to bias measured effect of the subsidy downwards. One study of couples who experienced male infertility but chose donor insemination rather than adoption shows that almost half believed donor insemination would be easier than adoption (Daniels 1994 ).
Other variables that may affect the demand for waiting children are the income and age structure of the population. Median household income for each state is negatively correlated with adoptions from foster care (specification (4) of table 3). This runs counter to evidence on adoptions in general. The National Survey of Family Growth reveals that women with higher incomes are more likely to have adopted a child (Chandra et al. 1999, p. 3) . The results reinforce the claim that that adoption assistance payments and up-front subsidies successfully reduce income barriers to adoption from foster care, even though adoption assistance subsidies are not meanstested.
The percentage of the population between 25 and 44 years of age measures the proportion of the population that is likely to be building families. As expected, the proportion of the population in this age group is positively associated with adoptions of children from foster care.
Recall that adoption services are provided by professional social workers that It is difficult to measure child welfare resources devoted to the adoption of children from foster care. By 1996 many states had begun to provide concurrent planning for children in foster care. Concurrent planning means that a social worker plans simultaneously for a child's reunification with birth parents and for a backupfrequently for adoption-should reunification efforts prove fruitless. To a great extent it is impossible to clearly divide child welfare spending into discrete adoption and foster care categories. Moreover, spending on adoption includes adoption assistance subsidies, which, of course, already appears in the regressions.
To capture the overall effect of resources devoted to child welfare, I control for child welfare spending per child in foster care, using data collected biennially by the suggested that race of the child was a particularly important area of concern for adoptive families. More recent surveys of adoptive families find a much smaller role for race, but some families still express strong preferences about the race, age, number of siblings and disabilities of children they are willing to adopt.
Just as families may have preferences about appropriate matches in adoption, social workers may have their own opinions about matching children and families with certain characteristics. Sherri Kossoudji (1989 Kossoudji ( , 1997 and Judy Fenster (2000) raise some important questions about racial bias in child welfare practice. Using
Michigan Department of Social Services data on foster care case openings and closings, Kossoudji finds that African American children who cannot be reunified with their birth families move towards permanency more slowly than Caucasian children.
Fenster finds negative attitudes towards transracial adoption are more common among African American social workers than among white social workers. Despite federal efforts to remove race from the list of considerations in adoption from foster care, on average only 13 to 14 percent of adoptions from foster care are transracial placements (Hansen and Simon 2004) . In a survey of families in California who adopted in the 1980s, 64 percent said they were willing to adopt a black child, but only five percent of the willing families actually adopted transracially (Brooks and James 2002) .
The data do not support the conclusion that race of the child is a significant barrier to adoption. There is no statistical association between a greater concentration of African American children in foster care and adoptions from foster care. Possibly states with higher concentrations of waiting children who are African American have been more successful at developing strategies for matching the children to families or for recruiting prospective adoptive families.
Note that data on some policy and control variables are not available for all states in all years. Specification (2) in table 3 includes state adoption and child welfare policies, but only has 143 observations. Because of the relatively small number of observations and because most adoption policies are implemented at the state level and are changed only infrequently, it makes sense to focus on effect subsidies within a fixed effects framework. Table 4 presents results of these simpler regressions, including linear and logarithmic specifications, with and without state and year effects.
Regressions (1) Regressions (4) through (6) of table 4 report the intuitive log-log specification, where the coefficient on adoption subsidy support ( β ) is interpreted as the elasticity of the adoption rate with respect to the subsidy. The estimated elasticity is between 0.12 and 0.20. That is, an increase in the average adoption assistance payment of one percent is associated with as much as a one-fifth of one percent increase in adoptions per 1,000 births.
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Because accurate counts of adoption of children from foster care are not available for the period before ASFA, the usual difference-in-difference estimate of the independent effect of adoption assistance payments cannot be calculated. However, first differencing can be used to assess whether the observed increase in adoption assistance within a state is correlated with an increase in adoptions in that state. 18 The first column of table 5 confirms that in a first-differenced model adoption assistance payments are positively related to adoptions per 1,000 births, but the effect is not statistically significant.
The relative weakness of the first-differenced model has two interpretations.
First, the results presented in table 3 indicate that it is likely that the differences in the control variables explain a large part of differences in changes adoption rates.
Moreover, other unmeasured state adoption and foster care policies may explain significant proportions of variations in (changes in) adoptions of children from foster care. A second interpretation is that the simple models presented in tables 3 and 4 do not adequately capture the dynamic of the legal process of adopting a child.
The finalization of the adoption of a waiting child is a legal procedure that takes several months to more than a year to complete. After a child is placed in the home of her adoptive family, there is generally a waiting period before the family may file a petition asking the court to finalize the adoption. The length of the waiting period varies by state. During the waiting period, the prospective adoptive family may receive maintenance payments on behalf of the child to be adopted, but the family may re-negotiate the amount of the monthly adoption assistance payment before the adoption petition is made and the adoption is finalized. The amount that is recorded in AFCARS is the monthly amount in effect at the time the adoption is finalized. The date that the adoption is finalized is subject to influences beyond the control of either social workers or adoptive families (for instance, court delays). It is not clear whether adoption assistance payments provides an incentive that increases a family's willingness to accept placement of any child for adoption, or whether increases in adoption assistance payments increase the likelihood of finalization of the adoption of a child who has already been placed with the family. The former implies a lagged effect between adoption assistance payments and adoptions from foster care; the latter implies a contemporaneous effect. In a cross-section covering only fiscal years 1996 and 1997, adoptions of children from foster care per 100,000 persons in the state are sensitive to the inclusion of a lagged effect of adoption assistance payments . Using all of the currently available data, covering 1996 through 2002, the previous year's average adoption assistance payment is positively associated with adoptions per 1,000 births. The regression results in the second column of table 5 are of the same order of magnitude as the results in columns (1) through (3) of table 3, indicating that the lagged and contemporaneous effects are about the same in the pooled data.
IV. CONCLUSION
While many questions about adoption policy remain to be answered (for example, more research on family recruitment and the matching process in adoption is much needed), this study of adoption from foster care provides at least three insights for economists and policymakers concerned with child welfare. First, more generous adoption subsidies to families increase the ratio of adoptions of children from foster care to the number of births. Second, there appears to be substitutability between types of adoption. This means that policymakers who seek to encourage adoptions from foster care must simultaneously consider policy regarding the alternatives. For example, policies such as tax credits that go primarily towards families who adopt through private or intercountry agencies may to reduce adoptions from foster care.
Finally, differences in child welfare spending do not explain much of the differences in adoptions from foster care; the allocation of funds between child welfare programs may not be efficient.
States are currently concerned about the growing liability that adoption assistance subsidy payments represent. One reason for the concern may be the way eligibility for federal mating funds is determined. In order to be eligible for the Title 4 Specifically, the ASFA allows states to proceed on a "fast track" to termination of parental rights under circumstances of extreme abuse; however, the fast track is seldom used (GAO 2002, p. 24) . ASFA also requires states to petition to terminate parental rights if a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months. There are exemptions, however, and the number of children exempted exceeded the number to whom "15 of 22" has been applied (GAO 2002, pp. 26-28) . The dearth of research on adoption policy goes beyond financial incentives. For example, the numbers 15 and 22, which are now very important numbers to social workers, were not the result of treatment of adoptions for waiting children should be re-added, but they argued without benefit of estimates of the costs or benefits of the incentive. 9 The simplification of perfect substitutes is a familiar feature of choice-betweenvarieties models (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980), but is not crucial to the argument. 10 In fact, subsidies and taxes influence the relative prices of all of the various substitutes in parenting. Substitutes in parenting include conceiving a child (without or with medical assistance), engaging a surrogate, as well as fostering and adopting. I forgo lengthy discussion of the substitutes in order to focus on child welfare and adoption policy.
11 Strict segmentation could reduce search costs for parents. Shughart and Chappell (1999) argue that orphanages served to reduce search costs for adoptive parents in an earlier time.
12 Calculation of author using AFCARS public use files.
